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Obama Committed to Ratifying Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Obama Committed to Ratifying Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Person sitting before row of monitors at CTBTO headquarters (AP Images)

The CTBTO headquarters in Vienna runs the International Monitoring System, which will enable the international community to enforce a global ban on nuclear testing.

14 June 2011

By Stephen Kaufman, IIP Staff Writer

Washington — The Obama administration will urge the U.S. Senate to ratify the 1996 treaty that bans all nuclear testing, and U.S. officials say they are in a position to make a strong case to overcome the objections lawmakers had when it came up for consideration in 1999.

In remarks to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna June 14, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Rose Gottemoeller said President Obama has an “unshakable commitment” to see the treaty ratified and entered into force.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s ratification is an essential step of Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons, which he articulated in an April 2009 speech in Prague, she said.

The president’s vision has led the United States to redefine its use of nuclear weapons in its national defense strategy; convene a 47-nation Nuclear Security Summit to lock down vulnerable nuclear materials over a four-year period; ratify the U.S.-Russia arms cut treaty (New START) to reduce nuclear arsenals to their lowest levels since the 1950s; and join with other members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to strengthen one of the world’s oldest nonproliferation initiatives.

Gottemoeller said the December 2010 debate over New START has helped to prepare the Obama administration for “an equally thorough and robust debate” with U.S. lawmakers over the CTBT. “We do not expect it will be easy or happen quickly, but we will work hard to make it happen,” she said.

When the Senate failed to ratify the CTBT by the required two-thirds majority in 1999, senators expressed concerns over whether the agreement could be effectively verified to prevent other countries from violating it, Gottemoeller said.

Despite the Senate’s action, the United States has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992, and it is bearing the full costs of operating and maintaining the 31 stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS) that the treaty has assigned to the United States for verification purposes.

“These actions tangibly demonstrate the commitment of the United States to prepare for the entry into force of this treaty,” Gottemoeller said.

She called for the completion of the IMS, which is currently at 85 percent, and said a fully functioning verification system will serve “as a strong deterrent for any state party contemplating a nuclear test” and will support arguments for its ratification.

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher told the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington May 10 that the Obama administration has three main arguments in favor of CTBT ratification.

“One, the United States no longer needs to conduct nuclear explosive tests, plain and simple. Two, a CTBT that has entered into force will obligate other states not to test and provide a disincentive for states to conduct such tests. And three, we now have a greater ability to catch those who cheat,” Tauscher said in her prepared remarks.

The United States is in “a curious position” when it comes to the CTBT, she said.

“We abide by the core prohibition of the treaty because we don’t need to test nuclear weapons. And we have contributed to the development of the International Monitoring System. But the principal benefit of ratifying the treaty, constraining other states from testing, still eludes us. That doesn’t make any sense to me and it shouldn’t make any sense to the members of the Senate,” Tauscher said.

If the treaty enters into force, it will be difficult for other countries to advance their nuclear weapons capabilities, since they would “risk either deploying weapons that might not work or incur international condemnation and sanctions for testing,” she said.

(This is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State)